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The present paper analyses the issue of the voting mechanism reform within the 
ECB, as a consequence of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Now it is known that 
beginning with the 1
st January 2007 the euro zone will “go east” as Slovenia will be the 
first Eastern country the will join EMU’s 3
rd stage. 
The eastern enlargement raises more complex challenges for the ECB because of 
three  main  aspects:  1.  the  new  member  states  have  to  “catch  up”  and  this  is  very 
important when setting the interest rate, 2. the new member state’s economic weight is 
very small comparative with their prospected position in the Governing Council, and 3. 
in  the  absence  of  the  reform  the  ECB’s  Governing  Council  would  become  the  body 
evincing  the  highest  number  of  voters,  as  compared  with  other  decision-making 
structures of other central banks, such as the FED, being very difficult for such a body to 
take monetary policy decisions. 
Based on those challenges, the ECB will implement a new voting mechanism. Even 
so, this will not solve the problem of having large economies with weak representation, 
and small economies that have strong representation in the Governing Council. 
 
1. The Eastern enlargement and the real convergence: why does it matter for 
ECB and its voting mechanism? 
 
Real convergence means the reduction or even elimination of per capita GDP gap 
between the EU 15 and new member states or acceding countries. This challenge of real 
convergence needs economic growth for SEE countries greater than EU’s, which implies 
the  convergence  of  prices  and  wages.  Eastern  countries  have  a  weak  performance 
concerning per capita GDP. 
Should real convergence be reached within the EMU, it is to be expected that poorer 
countries should have growth rates that are superior to the overall euro zone, until the 
levels of prices and productivity no longer substantially differ. This process will go on 
due to competitive markets, until the GDP per capita is the same all throughout the euro 
zone. 
Before  1999,  there  used  to  be  a  trend  stating  that  an  enlarged  monetary  union 
including  Portugal,  Spain,  Italy  and  Greece  will  pose  difficulties  to  the  ECB  in 
implementing  a  restrictive  monetary  policy.  Experience  has  shown  that  “poorer” 
countries register higher growth rates than the strongest, France and Germany. Moreover, 
the real convergence process involving “poorer” countries also entails higher prices hence 
higher inflation rates. Such countries would rather have a tighter monetary policy than the 
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ECB’s current one, addressing the overall interests of the euro zone. 
Currently, even a fast convergence in the case of Portugal, Spain or Greece is not 
likely to pose problems for the Eurosystem to reach its inflation target. These countries 
are nonetheless close to the EU average, and their ratio in the harmonized commodity 
price index for the euro zone is and shall remain low.
1. 
After EMU enlargement, things became more complicated because ECB will follow 
a monetary policy for the euro area interest, and it will not look at a specific country’s 
inflation. 
Anyway the Eastern countries will still have a low per capita GDP at the moment of 
EMU accession, when they will have voting rights in the Governing Council. This will 
complicate the voting process, in the context of more dynamic economies. 
That means that an enlarged euro area will be more dynamic and will need higher 
interest rates. Are there any chances for higher rates to be in the interest of the euro area 
as o whole? Which are the challenges for the Governing Council voting system? How 
important will be the inflation rate in Eastern countries for euro area inflation? We can 
see a few more challenges that EMU members as well as Eastern Countries have to meet. 
From this standpoint, we can see that both the ECB and the euro zone states would 
have reasons to fear new members acceding to the EM, even the more so if we take Great 
Britain’s accession into account. 
 
2. The necessity of a reform of the ECB’s voting mechanism 
 
As we know, the EMU institutional framework is underlain by centralized decision 
and decentralized implementation. The voting mechanism is extremely important since 
the participation of national representatives to decision-making is not to hold national 
interest into account. Even if the current mechanism is deemed adequate, the situation is 
likely to change following EMU enlargement by new members. 
The prospect of EMU enlargement thus raises challenges for the ECB organizational 
structure. Starting from the assumption that the euro zone will be enlarged by 15 new 
members, and lacking an ECB reform, we would have a Governing Council comprising 
33 members. The ECB Council would become the body evincing the highest number of 
voters, as compared with other decision-making structures of other central banks, such as 
the FED. Many analysts have proved that it will be very difficult for such a body to make 
monetary policy decisions. 
Another issue of the enlarged euro zone would be an overemphasized representation 
of  national  central  banks  in  the  decision-making  mechanism  (as  compared  with 
Bundesbank or the FED, where the Executive Board members dominate decision-making 
bodies). Moreover, taking into account the low ratio of the new members’ economies, 
they would have a political representation that surpasses by far the size of their national 
economies
2. As an example, from the 1
st January 2007 Slovenia will join the euro zone, 
                                                            
1  Spain  and  Portugal’s  ratios  are  1,8  respectively  9,1,  meaning  that  even  in  the  case  of 
rampant 10% inflation in these countries, the zone target can be reached if it is under 1% in the 
other countries. Anyway this situation could have negative effects by affecting the competitiveness 
of these economies.  
2 For a sound analysis, see Berger et alia (2003).  
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and its Governor (Mr. Mitja Gaspari) will have a voting right in the ECB’s Governing 
Council. As long as Slovenia’s GDP represents almost 0,4% of the euro zone GDP, Mr. 
Gaspari will have one vote, which will represent 7,6% of the governors voting rights, or 
5,2% of the total 19 voting rights. 
In  this  respect,  the  voting  mechanism  of  the  ECB  decision-making  bodies  will 
change. There were a series of proposals for change in publications in the field, among 
which: setting up a limited participation Monetary Policy Council that would operate 
under  the  Governing  Council;  introducing  constituents,  as  in  the  case  of  the  IMF; 
increasing the Executive Board’s number of votes or adjusting the national governors’ 
vote rights function of the economic size of every country.
1 
Consequently,  the  reform  issue  has  been  seriously  taken  into  consideration.  In 
December 2002, the ECB Governing Council has unanimously decided on the content of 
the  voting  mechanism  reform  proposal,  which  is  absolutely  necessary  when 
contemplating the euro zone enlargement prospects.
2 
Once the Nice Treaty was in force on February 1
st 2003, the ECB has formally 
adopted  a  recommendation  regarding  the  change  of  the  Governing  Council’s  voting 
mechanism. The ECB recommendation was passed on to the EU Council in February 
2003. Based on this recommendation and taking into account the opinions expressed by 
the Commission and the European Parliament, The EU Council, convened at the level of 
state or government heads, has unanimously decided
3 to change article 10.2 of the SBEC 
statute. The decision was ratified by the 15 member states in order to be in force
4. 
What does the decision comprise? According to it, all the members of the Governing 
Council  will  continue  to  attend  meetings.  Yet  the  number  of  national  central  bank 
governors having a right to vote will not be larger than 15, the 15 votes being covered by 
rotation based on a pre-set rule, whereas the Executive Board members will preserve their 
vote rights. In order to cover the necessity that governors with a right to vote should at all 
times be from countries that would represent together the euro zone interests, they will 
have the right to vote with a certain frequency, based on groups of countries. 
Governors will thus be part of different groups, function of their economies’ ratios in 
the euro zone, resulting by calculating an index that will comprise, apart from the GDP, 
the size of financial markets. When the number of countries in the euro zone reaches 
between 16 and 21, the rotation system will operate based on two such groups, and when 
the zone is made up of 22 members, the system will be based on three groups. Governors 
in each group will hold the right to vote for equal periods of time. 
Let  us  now  exemplify  its  operation  with  21  and  27  members.  According  to  the 
above-presented data, the proposal stipulates that once the EMU reaches 16 members, the 
number of national central bank governors with a right to vote in the Governing Council 
should be restricted to 15, based on the rotation system. Thus, in the case when EMU 
                                                            
1 Also see De Grauwe (2003), Berger (2003), European Commission (2004). 
2 The proposal was made based on the Nice Treaty provisions. European leaders have been 
unable to find a solution at the Nice meeting but they have inserted the empowerment clause, 
which  has  allowed  the  Council  to  change  the  voting  system  based  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission or the ECB. 
3 On 21.03.2003. 
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comprises 21 members, the two group system will be used. Member states among the 5 
large economies will have 4 votes, whereas the other 16 countries will hold 11 votes. In 
case the EMU is enlarged to 27 members, the three group system will operate, where the 
first 5 economies receive 4 votes, the following 14 have 8 votes, and the other 8 will have 
3 votes. (See annex 2) 
To conclude, the new voting system is characterized by soundness, being designed to 
adapt to the euro zone enlargement up to 27 states (the current EU states, which Romania 
and Bulgaria will join). 
Nonetheless,  one  can  appreciate  that  in  time,  the  rotation  system  might  prove 
difficult even if sound and robust, and that it is likely to lead to decision-making gaps 
when the euro area comprises a high number of members. 
Anyway, even in the event that the reform does not fully eliminate the difficulties in 
the  decision-making  system,  it  nonetheless  represents  a  step  forward.  We  should  not 
forget  that  Bundesbank  or  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (FED)  have  improved  the 
operation of their bodies in time.  It took  years for these institutions to learn how to 




3. Will the new voting mechanism eliminate the problems? 
 
Thus,  the  reform  of  the  ECB  Governing  Council’s  vote  system  is  of  special 
importance to eastern enlargement, and as we have shown, entails a limited number of 21 
votes
2, regardless of the number of members the euro zone will comprise. 
The  proposed  ECB  reform  will  not  fundamentally  respond  to  enlargement 
challenges.  With  a total  number  of  21  members  with  a  right  to  vote,  the  Governing 
Council will be smaller than without a reform but larger than, for instance, the similar 
FED body. 
 
                                                            
1 See also Berger 2002. 
2 15 of the Governors + 6 of the Executive Board  
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Graph 1  Economic importance and each country’s weight in the governors’ 
group 
Source: according to the annex, own calculations
1 
 
Moreover, the reform will not do away with the issue of member state representation. 
Even in the case of the proposed reform, states such as Italy, France or Germany will be 
insufficiently represented, whereas states such as Malta, Latvia or Estonia will have a 
larger ratio than the size of their economies. There are fears that a “tyranny” of minority 
might emerge even with a reform. 
Graph 1 proves the lack of symmetry between the economic importance of every 
country and the part they will play in an EMU enlarged to comprise 27 members. 
The  lack  of  correlation  between  economic  importance  and  the  role  of  national 
governors is even better outlined by graph 2, where one can see that the first group has a 
74.63% economic participation and 4 votes, whereas the second group would have just a 
24.21% GDP ratio and 8 votes! 
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Graph 2  Economic ratio and number of votes per group of countries 
Source: calculations in the annex 
 
If we are to refer to the last group as well, it will represent just 1,16% of the GDP yet 
it will hold 3 votes in the Governing Council. If in the case of the current euro zone 
composition,  the  Executive  Board  could  vote  for  an  average  interest  rate,  in  case  of 
enlargement  it  is  highly  likely  that  the  desired  interest  rate  distribution  should  be 
asymmetrical. Therefore the voting process will be difficult, running the risk that certain 
countries with major economic importance should be unsatisfied with the interest rate 
decided by the Governing Council. In this sense, the ECB and large states’ apprehension 
might be, again, grounded. 
Consequently,  even  if  prone  to  controversies,  the  reform  is  a  step  forward.  One 
should not forget that it took years to the Bundesbank or the FED to perfect the operation 




The  EU’s  Eastern  enlargement  means  the  possibility  of  euro  zone  eastern 
enlargement as well. In this sense we can imagine how hard will be to implement a 
monetary policy for 25 or 27 members. 
Based on this assumption that the euro zone will be enlarged by 15 new members, 
and  lacking  an  ECB  reform,  we  would  have  a  Governing  Council  comprising  33 
members, being very difficult for such a body to make monetary policy decisions.  
Moreover,  an  enlarged  euro  zone  would  be  an  overemphasized  representation  of 
national central banks in the decision-making mechanism (as compared with Bundesbank 
or the FED, where the Executive Board members dominate decision-making bodies).  
This is why the ECB’s viting mechanism is a reform subject. The voting syetem will 
change when the euro zone will comprise more than 15 members. From this point on the 
national governers total number will not exceede 15. 
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Executive  Board  members  will  preserve  their  vote  rights.  Governors  will  be  part  of 
different  groups,  function  of  their  economies’  ratios  in  the  euro  zone,  resulting  by 
calculating an index that will comprise, apart from the GDP, the size of financial markets. 
When the number of countries in the euro zone reaches between 16 and 21, the rotation 
system will operate based on two such groups, and when the zone is made up of 22 
members, the system will be based on three groups. Governors in each group will hold 
the right to vote for equal periods of time. Thus the new system is designed as a robust 
one, in order to assure the functioning of the euro zone comprising even 27 members. 
Anyway, if we look at the ECB’s voting mechanism, the proposed reform will not 
fundamentally respond to enlargement challenges: the Governing Council will be smaller 
than without a reform but larger than, for instance, the similar FED body. 
Moreover, reform will not do away with the issue of member state representation. 
Even  in  the  case  of  the  proposed  reform,  larger  economies  such  as  Italy,  France  or 
Germany will be insufficiently represented, whereas smaller economies states such as 
Malta or Estonia will have a larger ratio than the size of their economies. 
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ANNEX 1  THE RATIO/WEIGHT CALCULATION IN THE CASE OF ECB’S VOTING 
MECHANISM REFORM 
TABLE 1.1 
Crt. No.  Country  Wheight in overall 
GDP (2003) 
Each country’s relative 
ratio related to the 
overall number of 
governors’ votes 
  GROUP 1     
1  Germany  21.84%  5.33% 
2  United Kingdom  16.08%  5.33% 
3  France  15.83%  5.33% 
4  Italy  13.30%  5.33% 
5  Spain  7.58%  5.33% 
  GROUP 2     
6  The Netherlands   4.63%  3.81% 
7  Belgium  2.72%  3.81% 
8  Sweden  2.71%  3.81% 
9  Austria  2.28%  3.81% 
10  Denmark  1.93%  3.81% 
11  Poland  1.88%  3.81% 
12  Greece  1.56%  3.81% 
13  Finland  1.46%  3.81% 
14  Ireland  1.36%  3.81% 
15  Portugal  1.36%  3.81% 
16  Czech Republic  0.76%  3.81% 
17  Hungary   0.75%  3.81% 
18  Romania  0.50%  3.81% 
19  Slovakia  0.29%  3.81% 
  GROUP 3     
20  Slovenia  0.25%  2.50% 
21  Luxemburg  0.24%  2.50% 
22  Bulgaria  0.18%  2.50% 
23  Lithuania  0.16%  2.50% 
24  Cyprus  0.12%  2.50% 
25  Latvia  0.09%  2.50% 
26  Estonia  0.08%  2.50% 
27  Malta  0.04%  2.50% 
Total    100%  100% 
  
  81 
 
Table 1.2 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  No. of 
countries 












Group 1  5  4  80.00%  16.00%  26.67%  5.33% 
Group 2  14  8  57.14%  4.08%  53.33%  3.81% 
Group 3  8  3  37.50%  4.69%  20.00%  2.50% 
  27  15      100.00%   
Source: Eurostat, ECB - Monthly Bulletin 05/03; own clculations 
Notes: 
1.  The division per groups (table 1.1) is performed function of the GDP weight 
only; 
2.  In table 1.2, columns 1 and 2, groups and number of votes comply with the ECB 
proposal; 
3.  In column 5, the group weight in the overall governors’ votes is calculated by 
dividing the number of votes (4, 8 or 3) to the whole number (15); 
4.  In column 6, every country’s ratio/weight matches the group ratio to the number 
of countries in the group; 
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Annex 2  The reform of ECB’s 
voting mechanism 
 
Table  2.1  The  euro  zone  having  between  16  and  21  members:  two-group 
rotation system (first stage) 
 
Number of governors in the Governing Council 
 
16  17  18  19  20  21  22 and 
more 
No. of voting 
rights/ No. of 
governors 
 
5/5  5/5  5/5  4/5  4/5  4/5  1
st 
group  
Voting frequency  100%  100%  100%  80%  80%  80% 
No. of voting 
rights/ No. of 
governors 
10/11  10/12  10/13  11/14  11/15  11/16  2
nd 
group 
Voting frequency  91%  83%  77%  79%  73%  69% 
The sum of voting 









Table 2.2 The euro zone having more than 21 members – three-group rotation 
system (second stage) 
 
Number of governors in the Governing Council   
16-21  22  23  24  25  26  27 
No. of voting 
rights/ No. of 
governors 
 




Voting frequency  80%  80%  80%  80%  80%  80% 
No. of voting 
rights/ No. of 
governors 
 




Voting frequency  73%  67%  67%  62%  62%  57% 
No. of voting 
rights/ No. of 
governors 
 















50%  50%  43%  43%  38%  38% 
The sum of voting rights  15  15  15  15  15  15  15 
 
Source: The adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing Council, în ECB, 
Monthly Bulletin, may 2003 